A progressive second price (PSP) auction mechanism was proposed in (Semret, Liao, Campbell & Lazar 2000) for network bandwidth allocation. In this paper a quantized version of this mechanism (Q-PSP) is analyzed where the agents have similar demand functions and submit bids synchronously. It is shown that the non-linear dynamics induced by this mechanism are such that the prices bid by the various agents and the quantities allocated to these agents converge in at most five iterations or oscillate indefinitely; this behaviour is not only independent of the number of agents involved but is also independent of the number of quantization levels.
Introduction
Progressive auctions constitute a class of decentralized decision procedures for a set of agents whose possibly distinct preferences for a market good are expressed in terms of their demand functions. In a progressive auction, each agent at each instant has a particular market price function depending on the overall set of agents' bids; with this and its demand function it then computes its next bid. In the setting considered in this paper, the dynamical convergence of this distributed non-linear recursion generates a single market price and the resulting distribution of bids and assigned quantities possesses a social value which has efficient (optimum) properties within the corresponding constrained set of bids and quantities.
Progressive second price auctions (PSP) (Semret et al. 2000) were proposed for dynamic Internet service market-pricing with the objective of providing consistent services when the so-called DiffServ customer access control protocols (Faucheur & Lai 2003) are in use. In particular it was shown that for differentiated services allocated between multiple agents there exist Nash market equilibria when all players bid their real marginal valuation of the bandwidth resource. In (Maille & Tuffin 2004a , Maille & Tuffin 2004b , an accelerated convergence version of PSP was derived which avoids signaling bursts but at the cost of multi-dimensional bidding.
The PSP dynamical auction mechanism introduced and analyzed in (Lazar & Semret 2000 , Semret 1999 was defined in such a manner that agents compute the ǫ-best response to the current strategy profile of their opponents as their bids. Each agent's bid consists of (i) a required quantity and (ii) a unit-price (calculated using its own demand functions). All agents submit bids cyclically until an (ǫ-Nash) equilibrium is reached where ǫ corresponds to a bid fee. It was proved in (Lazar & Semret 2000 , Semret 1999 ) that PSP has the desirable properties of incentive compatibility and efficiency (i.e. bids correspond to the actual level of demand at a given price and the sum of all utility functions are optimized (Lazar & Semret 2000 , Semret 1999 ); however, the rate of convergence is inversely proportional to the bid fee ǫ.
In this paper (see also the conference version (Qu, Jia & Caines 2007a) ), a quan-tized version of this mechanism, Q-PSP, is analyzed where all agents have similar demand functions. In Q-PSP, each agent submits a bid which consists of both a unit-price and a quantity, as in PSP. Then it uses the following quantized strategy: it computes its best quantity response with respect to the previous strategy profile of its opponents; chooses a lowest quantized price as the unit bid price; then calculates the bid quantity based on the unit bid price and the agent's own demand function (see Section 2.2 for details). In Q-PSP auctions, all agents submit bids synchronously until a (Nash) equilibrium in the quantized framework is reached.
It is believed that PSP and Q-PSP constitute interesting classes of decentralized dynamical optimization procedures.
We will show that when the agents' demand functions are similar in a precise sense, the nonlinear dynamics induced by Q-PSP are such that the prices bid by the various agents and the quantities allocated to these agents converge in at most five iterations or commence to oscillate indefinitely; this behaviour is independent of the number of agents involved and of the number of quantization levels. The result is a generalization of the first one of this type (see (Qu 2005 , Qu et al. 2007a and Appendix D to this paper) where it was shown that for a set of agents with identical demand functions convergence or the onset of oscillations takes place in three steps, again independent of the number of agents or quantization levels.
The results of this paper are further extended in (Jia & Caines 2008) which gives a probabilistic analysis of rapid convergence under completely general conditions on a set of randomly distributed demand functions for the collection of agents.
Lazar and Semret suggested in (Lazar & Semret 2000) that each agent bids successively its ǫ-best reply with respect to the current bids of its opponents, whereas here we assume that all agents make the quantized bids simultaneously with respect to the previous bids of their opponents, these being the best response dynamics described in (Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998 , Fudenberg & Levine 1998 . Both the cyclic and the simultaneous update rules are widely used in learning in games (Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998 , Fudenberg & Levine 1998 . For PSP, one of main disadvantages is its slow convergence, which brings about signal bursts, i.e. a part of channel capacity has to be taken for communication between agents and sellers. Here we prove, in comparison with the successive bid system in (Lazar & Semret 2000) , that Q-PSP systems may converge in at most five steps when all agents share similar demand functions. Such convergence is independent of the number of agents.
Hence, from the viewpoint of modeling, synchronous Q-PSP reactions avoid the signaling overhead of PSP.
A brief overview of the setting for such auction mechanisms and their analysis is as follows: The classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Makowski & Ostroy 1987 ) has been applied to distributed large-scale systems due to the fact that for VCG (i) incentive compatibility (i.e. an agent's bids corresponds to true valuations) is a dominant strategy and (ii) knowledge of other agents' valuations (demand functions) cannot improve an agent's expected utility. This reduces the complexity of auction mechanism design and of the decision making itself. The modification and generalization of the VCG mechanism has been studied in (Semret et al. 2000 , Dasgupta & Maskin 2000 , Feigenbaum & Shenker 2002 , among others. Recently, a non-VCG efficient mechanism design was proposed by R. Jain (Jain 2007) and R. Jain and P. Varaiya (Jain & Varaiya 2006) to achieve efficiency (i.e achievement of social optima), budget-balance and individual rationality by compromising on incentive compatibility in combinatorial (i.e. agents may bid on combinations of items) and double (i.e. sellers and buyers submit bids)
auctions.
The convergence analysis of bidding processes usually focuses upon the existence and stability of those Nash equilibria which can in principle be obtained from the differential equations describing the time evolution of allocated resources and agents' payments (see e.g. (Karpowicz & Malinowski 2007b , Karpowicz & Malinowski 2007a , Kelly, Maulloo & Tan 1998 ). Furthermore, approximations have been used (Bikhchandani, de Vries, Schummer & Vohra 2001 ) to obtain computational tractability for the linear programming and integer programming problems of equilibrium computation which would otherwise be NP-hard. In general, convergence rates of auction processes have not been thoroughly studied, an exception being the PSP analysis (Lazar & Semret 2000) where the rate depends upon the reserve price, see below. Moreover, it is to be noted that feedback delays in communication networks may result in slow convergence to Nash equilibria (Lazar & Semret 2000) and may even introduce instability into the long-term convergence process (Kelly et al. 1998 ).
In the work of Maille and Tuffin (Maille & Tuffin 2004a , Maille & Tuffin 2004b ), a multi-bid auction was constructed to achieve one step convergence of PSP systems. In multi-bid auctions it is assumed that each agent submits multiple bids simultaneously once and only once; then the market clearing price (Maille & Tuffin 2004a ) and the allocations are calculated. It is known that the precision and the efficiency of this mechanism depend on the dimension of each agent's bid set: the more bids each agent submits, the more efficient the equilibrium is. That is to say, in order to achieve a satisfactory approximation of each agent's own valuation function (so that the final state is close to a (Nash) Equilibrium), the dimension of each agent's bid set must be large. This latter fact engenders high computational, communication, and transmission costs.
We summarize the distinctions between the PSP and Q-PSP mechanisms as follows: (i) In Q-PSP auctions, all agents submit their bids simultaneously, but the cyclic bid algorithm is applied in PSP. (ii) The strategies in Q-PSP are quantized and all agents' bids are based upon a set of quantized prices, while there is no quantization in PSP. To support the quantization hypothesis we note that bidding with quantized prices often occurs in real auctions due to standard institutional rules (Sotheby's 2007) . (iii) 5-step convergence to µ-Nash equilibrium is achieved in Q-PSP (where µ is a measure of the quantization level and the divergence between the demand functions), but in PSP convergence to an ǫ-Nash equilibrium is shown to be inversely proportional to ǫ. (iv) There is no bid fee in Q-PSP, i.e. ǫ = 0, but in PSP ǫ > 0.
The paper is organized as follows: we begin in Section 2 with an introduction of the quantized PSP mechanism and the associated dynamical auction system. In Section 3, we present the main result of the paper and in Section 4 we summarize our results and outline future work. The appendices contain the basic lemmas and combinatorial arguments required to establish the main results.
2 The Quantized Progressive Second Price Auction and the Associated Dynamical System
Progressive Second Price Auctions
To begin, we give a summary of the PSP auction first introduced in (Lazar & Semret 2000) which forms a part of the authors' overall market based quantity allocation model. Consider a noncooperative game where N agents buy the fixed amount of bandwidth C from one seller. Suppose each agent A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, makes a bid s i = (p i , q i ) to the seller, where p i is the unit-price the agent is willing to pay and q i is the quantity the agent desires. s ≡ [s i ] 1≤i≤N is the bidding profile and
is the profile of Agent A i 's opponents. The market price function (MPF) of Agent A i is defined as:
which is interpreted as the minimum price an agent bids in order to obtain the bandwidth z given the opponents' profile s −i . Its inverse function Q i is defined as follows:
which means the maximum available quantity at a bid price of y given s −i . With this notation, the PSP allocation rule (Tuffin 2002 ) is defined as
where a i denotes the quantity Agent A i obtains by a bid price p i (when the opponents bid s −i ) and the charge to Agent A i by the seller is denoted c i .
is differentiable; (3) θ ′ ≥ 0 is non-increasing and continuous; and finally (4) there
Agent A i 's utility is defined as 4) which yields the agent's preferences.
Under the PSP rule above, it is shown in (Lazar & Semret 2000 , Tuffin 2002 that given s −i Agent A i 's ǫ-best response s i = (w i , v i ) in the sense of a Nash move (i.e. where s i is chosen to maximize its utility with s −i held constant) is given by:
where ǫ > 0 is the bid fee, b i is Agent A i 's budget, and every agent has an elastic demand function. Further it is shown in (Lazar & Semret 2000) that in case the bidding iterations converge they will converge at a rate inversely proportional to ǫ to an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Quantized Progressive Second Price Auctions
We now analyze the Quantized Progressive Second Price Auction introduced in (Qu et al. 2007a) . Adopting a similar framework to the original PSP scheme, we assume for Q-PSP that all agents follow quantized strategies where their bids are based upon a set of quantized prices as described below.
Let us define horP i = {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x ≤ C, y = P i (x)} and then define vertP i = {(x, y) : P i (x) < y, y ′ = P i (x + δ) ⇒ y ≤ y ′ ∀δ > 0 sufficiently small} (see the horizontal and vertical segments in Fig. 1 ). Further define the market price curve
Taken together these definitions make P cv i an increasing relation in the (x, y) ≡ (quantity, price) space such that the relation is a piece-wise constant function at all except a finite number of points where it is given by a vertical segment. When ǫ = 0, the intersection in (2.5) between any agent's demand curve and its market price curve has the interpretation that it would be the best reply of each agent once the agent senses, via (2.1), how much the other agents are collectively bidding. In the context of the equations (2.5), we will adopt the following hypotheses:
(1) All bid quantities q are bounded by C, i.e. 0 ≤ q ≤ C,
(2) There is no bid fee, i.e. ǫ = 0,
The budget b i of each agent is sufficiently large that the condition z 0
Remark 2.2. The integral constraint in (2.5) is not referred to again because (3) is always assumed to hold.
An intersection between a demand curve and a market price curve can occur in two distinct ways, namely the demand curve may either intersect horP i or vertP i .
Under the quantization assumption, in the first case, agents make normal bids as in (2.5), i.e. the values of the price and the quantity at the intersection. In the second case, the unique point of intersection (z * , p * * ) lies on vertP i . Agents are then assumed to take the price p * i corresponding to the value of P i at the limit z * from the left of {z ≥ 0, θ ′ i (z) > P i (z)} and the corresponding quantized price satisfies
Here B p is defined as the basic quantized set of prices. These two cases are shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 respectively, where three agents are considered. The result of applying the hypotheses (1)-(3) leads to the recursively
Figure 1: Market price curves of Agent A 1 , A 2 , and on a vertical segment and w 2 = p * 2 = p 3 .
equations:
with the initial conditions p
p is defined as the initial quantized bid price set. One may verify that
constitutes a minimum dimension state process for the dynamical system (2.6) and for all k, {p
p , and hence
Best Reply Bids for Q-PSP
In this subsection we analyze the difference between the best quantized strategy of each agent (which is effectively uncomputable) and the dynamical recursion prescribed by (2.6). The best quantized strategy of each agent should be the quantized price p i ∈ B 
Now the allocated quantity within the best strategy is a ; and the allocated quantity within the best quantized strategy is
and the quantized strategy in (2.6) brings about the allocated quantity
where p k+1 i is calculated from (2.6c). Here the quantized strategy in (2.6) may not be the best (quantized) strategy for each agent, but it is the strategy that provides the lowest bid price so that the maximum available quantity is greater than the desired quantity v i . Hence the quantized strategy is a γ-best reply with
where u i is the utility function of Agent A i defined in (2.4).
Furthermore, if a Q-PSP dynamical system converges to a quantized price p * , then s * is a δ-Nash equilibrium with s * i = (p * , θ −1 i (p * )) in the sense that:
It is to be noted that in PSP and Q-PSP it is assumed that each agent A i makes bids only based upon its own knowledge, i.e. only based upon its own demand function and the bidding profiles of the other agents.
Rapid Convergence for Multiple Users
Hypothesis 3.1. Let the initial condition for the Q-PSP system:
We let Φ be the family of (elastic) demand functions on [0, C]. We observe that any function θ ′ ∈ Φ is continuous on the compact set [0, C] and is 1 : 1 on [0, C];
it follows that θ ′ −1 is continuous and 1 :
This hypothesis guarantees that the family of demand curves will not intersect the corresponding market price functions in a widely dispersed set of points .
We remark here that the term (a price) survives (to the next algorithm iteration, which is used in the proof of the Theorem 3.4 and elsewhere, has the precise meaning that the price in question is to be found in the set of (agents') prices generated by the Q-PSP algorithm at the subsequent iteration step; furthermore, for brevity we often use the phrase the system converges instead of the long statement "the system state trajectory converges".
Theorem 3.4. Subject to Hypothesis 3.1 and Hypothesis 3.3, the Q-PSP system 
(2) Convergence in at most five iterations to a non-trivial order-two orbit (i.e. an order two sustained oscillation) such that at Iteration 2k + 1 (k ≥ 1), r agents have the (price, quantity) pair (p * , θ
and N − r agents have the pair of
, r agents have the (price, quantity) pair of
, where p * = p n and p * * = p n−1 for some n with 1 ≤ n ≤ N , or p * = p n−1 and p * * = 0.
Outline of Proof Method for Theorem 3.4:
The proof is summarized by the following sequential steps: first we prove all prices strictly above and strictly below the (at most three) intersection prices {p n , p n−1 , p n−2 } given by {demand
are eliminated at k = 1; then we recompute the market price curves of all agents at k = 1 and we show that the resulting market price functions' domains have at most three prices {p n , p n−1 , 0} based on the relations between p n , p n−1 , N , and C; we then show that the intersections {demand curves}∩ ∪
give convergence in two cases at k = 1; at k = 2, we recompute the market price curves under the non-convergent conditions of k = 1, and show that, though the bid quantity set is changed, the three resulting possible cases repeat the situation at k = 1: convergence occurs in two of the three cases and the non-convergent case results in another three possible cases at k = 2, again with the same bid price set and a possibly different bid quantity set; this continues until k = 5, when all possible relations between p n , p n−1 , N , and C are proved to satisfy either convergence conditions or oscillation conditions (i.e. the non-convergent case at the (k + 2)th step repeats exactly the non-convergent case at the kth step). In particular, the non-convergent case at k = 5 leads to an oscillation. Here p n , p n−1 are time-invariant and the quantized price set at k ≥ 1 consists at most of 0, p n , and p n−1 .
In the proof of Theorem 3.4 we will repeatedly use the following Three (Dynamic) Features Lemma, where the reader should note the appearance of the ≥ term in the definition of the notion of a remaining quantity.
Lemma 3.5. (Three Features Lemma) The largest quantized price, such that the bid quantity is strictly greater than the remaining quantity (C − j:p k j ≥p q k j ), is the price bid by each agent at the subsequent step as determined by the Q-PSP algorithm.
Proof. It is evident from the dynamics of the Q-PSP algorithm shown in (2.6) that any one agent's bid s Case (k = 0, I): All lie on one segment of vertP
Case (k = 0, II): All lie on one segment of horP This implies that at most three adjacent prices result at the first iteration for the Q-PSP dynamical system.
Proof of Theorem 3.4 (Continued):
We start the proof from the cases given in Lemma 3.6. Fig. 4 demonstrate these three cases we will discuss below. For simplicity, in the following we define Since all intersections at k = 0 lie on the segment (x, y) :
and from the non-increasing property of demand functions, we obtain C −
(3.8)
But from Definition 3.2 and Hypothesis (3.3), there exists ϕ with ϕ(·) θ
(3.12) (3.11) implies that C is less than the sum of the quantities that all agents except A m bid with the bid price p m ; (3.12) implies that C is less than the total quantity when all agents including Agent A m to bid p m . These two results guarantee that all agents' demand functions intersect their own MPFs at the price p m at k = 1 when m > 1, that is to say, all N bid prices converge to p m if m > 1.
Remark 3.7. We verify the conclusion above by the Three Features Lemma. For
expresses the available quantity at the price p m , and (3.11) implies
Based on the fact that p m is the highest quantized price at k = 1 and by an applications of the Three Features Lemma, it is seen that p m will be chosen by all agents A j except A m at next step. On the other hand, (3.12) implies
, and the right part of the inequality is the remaining quantity at the price p m for Agent A m . By the Three Features Lemma, p m will also be the strategy of A m at the next step. So the bid prices converge to p m at that step.
The quantity relationships in (3.11) and (3.12) at k = 1 are shown in Fig. 5 .
If m = 1, we obtain from (3.8) that
We will examine the dynamical system behavior after k = 1 under the condition (3.13) later within Possible Cases at k = 1.
•
It is shown in the proof of Lemma 3.6 that, in Case (k = 0, II), there exists n, 0 < n ≤ N, and r 1 , 0 < r 1 ≤ N − 1, such that r 1 agents bid p n and N − r 1 agents bid p n−1 (where at least A n bids p n−1 ) at k = 1.
the set of agents with the bid price p n at k = 1; and S 2 = {i : p 1 i = p n−1 , 0 < i ≤ N }, the set of agents with the bid price p n−1 at k = 1. The MPFs of these two sets of agents at k = 1 are shown in Fig. 6 . Because all intersections at k = 0 lie on the segment
(see the second graph of Fig. 4) , we have for n > 1 at k = 1
since subject to Hypothesis (3.3) (see (3.10)), for any 1 which is proved in (3.9) and implies that
We can see (3.13) is a special case of (3.17). We will examine the dynamical system behavior after k = 1 under the condition (3.17) within Possible Cases at k = 1.
If n = 1 here, p n−1 = p 0 = 0 and we only need find the relations between C, r 1 , and p n , which will also be discussed under Possible Cases at k = 1.
• Case (k = 0, III)
In Case (k = 0, III), if only two prices {p n , p n−1 ; N ≥ n > 1} result from the intersections at k = 0, then the relations between C, p n , p n−1 , and r 1 will satisfy (3.17).
If three prices {p n , p n−1 , p n−2 ; n ≥ 3} result from the intersections at k = 0, only Agent A n−1 bids p n−2 after k = 0, which is proved in Lemma 3.6. Here we assume, among the remaining N −1 agents, r 1 (r 1 ≥ 1) agents bid p n and N −r 1 −1 agents bid p n−1 at k = 1. Since, when three prices result at k = 1, the intersections at k = 0 lie on the two adjacent segments: {(x, y); y = p n , x ∈ (C − N i=n q i , C − N i=n+1 q i ]} and {(x, y); x = C − N i=n q i , y ∈ (p n−1 , p n )} (which is shown in Lemma 3.6, and otherwise only two prices result at k = 1; see the third graph of Fig. 4) , we have
from (3.16) (3.18) and n ≥ 3. Possible Cases at k = 1 (C1.1-C1.3 in Fig. 3 ):
Now we study the convergence property of the following Q-PSP dynamical system: all r 1 agents in S 1 bid p n , N − r 1 (or N − r 1 − 1) agents in S 2 (or S * 2 ) bid p n−1 , (Agent A n−1 bids p n−2 ), and (3.17) (or (3.20)) holds. Based on the possible relations between N , r 1 , C, p n and p n−1 and (3.17) (or (3.20)), one of the following three mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases will occur at k = 1:
Here we can see that the special systems mentioned above in Case (k = 0, II) and Case (k = 0, III) with p n−1 = 0 and n = 1 will also satisfy one of these three conditions at k = 1 if we simply modify Case (k = 1, III) so that v 2 ≤ C. Convergent Cases at k = 1 (C1.1 and C1.3 in Fig. 3 ):
We obtain from (3.21) that in Case (k = 1, I) N-r-1 users' market price fns (for example 's MPF with ) Figure 9 : Demand functions and MPFs in Case (k = 1, II) if three prices result from k = 0
By applying (2.6) and the Three Features Lemma, for any j ∈ S 1 , we have v 2 j > C − i∈S1,i =j ϕ i (p n ) and for any j ∈ S 2 , we have v 2 j > C − i∈S1 ϕ i (p n ). Then from (2.6c), we achieve p 2 j = p n for any 0 < j ≤ N , which means all N agents will choose (p n , ϕ i (p n )) as their next bid and the dynamical system will converge to the price p n .
In Case (k = 1, III), from (3.23), we have for all j ∈ S 1 C − i∈S1,i =j N-r-1 users' market price fns (for example 's MPF with ) 
Since the left hand sides of inequalities (3.24) and (3.25) express the available quantities and the right hand sides express the possible bid quantities, we may apply the Three Features Lemma (or the Q-PSP algorithm (2.6) directly) to show that the intersections between all agents' demand functions and MPFs at k = 1 lie on the horizontal segments corresponding the price p n−1 , which implies all the agents will have (p n−1 , ϕ i (p n−1 )) as their next bid, i.e. converge to p n−1 . It is clear that the convergence analysis above in Case (k = 0, I) is a special case of Case (k = 1, I).
Non-convergent Cases at k = 1 (C1.2 in Fig. 3 ):
At k = 2 in Case (k = 1, II), we assume that r 2 > 0 agents bid (p n−1 , ϕ i (p n−1 )).
Based on (3.22) and the Three Features Lemma, all agents in S 1 = {i : p 1 i = p n , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } will bid p n−1 at k = 2, and there may exist some agents in
Hence the rest of the N − r 2 agents will bid (p n , ϕ i (p n )) at k = 2 by the Q-PSP algorithm. The details go as follows:
If r 2 = r 1 , from the discussion above, we obtain that all agents in S 1 bid p n−1 and all the rest of the agents bid p n at k = 2, which implies at k = 1
otherwise, if
at least A j , j = arg min j∈S2 ϕ j (p n ) will bid p n−1 at k = 2, which implies r 2 ≥ r 1 +1.
If r 2 > r 1 , from (3.22) and (3.26) we obtain at k = 1 27) with ϕ j1 (p n ) < ϕ j2 (p n ) and j 1 , j 2 ∈ S 2 ; so all agents i ∈ S 2 with a greater ϕ i (p n ) than ϕ j1 (p n ) will bid p n at k = 2 since their demand functions intersects the corresponding MPFs at p n , and all agents i ∈ S 2 with a smaller ϕ i (p n ) than ϕ j2 (p n ) will bid p n−1 at k = 2 since their bid quantities at p n are less than the remaining quantity C − i∈S1 ϕ i (p n ), i.e. Agent A j1 would bid the (r 2 − r 1 )th smallest quantity among all agents in S 2 at the bid price p n and Agent A j2 would bid the (r 2 + 1 − r 1 )th smallest quantity. Also all agents in S 1 will bid p n−1 at k = 2.
The market price curves generated at k = 2 in this case have the form shown in Fig. 6 . Define S 3 = {i :
It is clear that S 3 ⊆ S 2 and S 4 ⊇ S 1 . Then there will be three possible cases at this moment based on the relations between C, r 2 , N , p n and p n−1 and (3.20):
Convergent Cases at k = 2 (C2.1 and C2.3 in Fig. 3 
):
In Case (k = 2, I) or Case (k = 2, III), all N agents will take (p n , ϕ i (p n )) or (p n−1 , ϕ i (p n−1 )) respectively after k = 2 which causes convergence.
Non-convergent Cases at k = 2 (C2.2 in Fig. 3 
Case (k = 2, II) occurs when it is the case that
that is to say, the constraint conditions both in Case (k = 1, II) and in Case (k = 2, II) should be satisfied, since Case (k = 1, II) is the precondition such that Case (k = 2, II) occurs. The preconditions on each layer of the proof tree shown in Fig. 3 make the the conditioning parameter value sets tightening down as one goes down layer by layer in the proof tree, i.e. the constraint conditions at each layer must hold at subsequent layers.
At k = 3 in Case (k = 2, II), r 3 agents will take (p n , ϕ i (p n )), where r 3 ≤ r 2 , and N − r 3 agents will take (p n−1 , ϕ i (p n−1 )). The similar condition like (3.26) or (3.27) is satisfied for r 3 . Define S 5 = {i :
It is clear that S 3 ⊆ S 6 and S 4 ⊇ S 5 . Then only three cases may occur based on the relations between C, r 3 , N , p n and p n−1 , and under the constraint (3.17) (or (3.20)), (3.28):
Convergent Cases at k = 3 (C3.1 and C3.3 in Fig. 3 
In Case (k = 3, I) or Case (k = 3, III), if they occur, all N agents will bid p n or p n−1 respectively after k = 3.
Non-convergent Cases at k = 3 (C3.2 in Fig. 3 
At k = 4 in Case (k = 3, II), r 4 agents will take p n−1 , and N − r 4 agents will take p n . Define S 7 = {i :
Then only three cases may occur:
Convergent Cases at k = 4 (C4.1 and C4.3 in Fig. 3 
In Case (k = 4, I) or Case (k = 4, III), all N agents will bid p n or p n−1 respectively after k = 4.
Non-convergent Cases at k = 4 (C4.2 in Fig. 3 
At k = 5 in Case (k = 4, II), r 5 agents will take p n , and N − r 5 agents will take
Convergent Cases at k = 5 (C5.1 and C5.3 in Fig. 3 
In Case (k = 5, I) or Case (k = 5, III), all N agents will bid p n or p n−1 respectively after k = 5.
Non-convergent Cases at k = 5 (C5.2 in Fig. 3 
At k = 6 in Case (k = 5, II), r 6 agents will take p n−1 , and N −r 6 agents will take
Finally, we can show that at k = 6 the system has either converged to the limit price p n or p n−1 of the step k = 5 or oscillations begin which continue indefinitely.
Specifically, Case (k = 6, I) and Case (k = 6, III) will not occur since the relationships between agents' bid prices, bid quantities and C involved in these two cases contradict the constraint conditions in the previous non-convergent cases, while, if it occurs, Case (k = 6, II) must repeat Case (k = 4, II).
It is to be noted that here we consider the "worst" case when Case (k = 5, II) happens. By carefully checking the constraint conditions at each step, convergence or the onset of oscillations may occur before (k = 5, II). For example, given certain bid quantity constraints, Case (k = 4, II) may repeat Case (k = 2, II) such that the oscillation begins at k = 2.
Due to the complex combinatoric nature of the analysis of these cases it is placed in the Appendix of the paper. This concluded the proof of the theorem. 
Efficiency
In those cases where the Q-PSP system converges to a quantized price p ∞ = 0 and the quantity allocation is a * , the steady state is a δ-Nash equilibrium in the quantized framework as described in Section 2. Applying Proposition 3 in (Lazar 
, where A describes the set of all possible quantity allocations under the quantization assumption, and it is assumed that for all i, 0 < i ≤ N , the elastic demand functions 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have addressed a Q-PSP auction mechanism for network bandwidth allocation. We provided a rigorous analysis of the rapid convergence in Q-PSP dynamical systems. The convergence was shown to be independent of both the number of agents and the number of quantization levels. We have also discussed the efficiency of the mechanism.
Current simulations demonstrate that the rapid convergence property still holds for a large range of dynamical Q-PSP systems in cases where the agents have significantly different demand functions (see Fig. 12 ). This is the subject of the research (Jia & Caines 2008) , which gives a probabilistic analysis of rapid convergence under completely general conditions on a set of randomly distributed demand functions for the collection of agents.
Furthermore the bids of the agents in a Q-PSP system may be viewed as decentralized feedback controls. In this context, a current topic of study is the extent to which one can further control dynamical Q-PSP systems so as to avoid oscillatory behaviour and to manipulate the value of the social welfare function. The three principal control methods under analysis are: (i) manipulation of C, (ii) manipulation of a bid fee ǫ, and (iii) the existence of an independent control agent.
Karpowicz, M. & Malinowski, K. (2007b). On efficient resource allocation in com

A An Example of Fast Convergence
It was shown in Section 3 that a Q-PSP dynamical system converges to a limit or settles into an oscillation in limited iterations, regardless of the number of agents.
To illustrate this, assume there are N agents and initially,
For simplicity the demand curve is taken to be linear and identical for all agents. Most adjacent steps of the market price curve of Agent A i , P i , are of equal height i N except where a discontinuity of more than a single price difference of the form {p i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N } takes place; this discontinuity will be termed a jump. The jump in P i would occur when both p i−1 and p i+1 are present in the set {0, p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , ..., p N }. Consequently, P N contains no price jump. In other words, the price jump is due to the fact that Agent A i 's price is necessarily absent in its own MPF. Let N = 5 and initial conditions are based on (A.29). Thus p 1 < p 2 < p 3 < p 4 < p 5 , and q 1 > q 2 > q 3 > q 4 > q 5 . The market price curves for all 5 agents are shown in Fig. 13 .
Assume the demand curve is linear and identical for all 5 agents, and assume that it passes through their market price curves in the middle range as shown in Fig. 13 Thus there are cases where the price jump is above, below and close to the intersection point. To illustrate what takes place in the first iteration, all 5 market price curves and the demand curve are drawn on the same plot.
Consequently, at k = 1, each agent would change to a new bid in the next iteration as follows: Agent 1 : from (p 1 , q 1 ) to (p 2 , q 2 ) Agent 2 : from (p 2 , q 2 ) to (p 1 , q 1 ) Agent 3 : from (p 3 , q 3 ) to (p 2 , q 2 ) Agent 4 : from (p 4 , q 4 ) to (p 2 , q 2 ) Agent 5 : from (p 5 , q 5 ) to (p 2 , q 2 ) which is shown in Fig. 13 .
Thus, at k = 1, the market price curves and the demand curve are shown in Fig. 14. At k = 2, all 5 agents would settle down to (p 2 , q 2 ). Therefore, with one identical demand curve for all 5 agents the top prices get cleared out in the first iteration, whereas the bottom prices are eliminated in the following iteration.
B Basic Lemmas
In this section, we will present four crucial lemmas for the proof of the main theorem. We first define Enveloping Market Price Function (EMPF) as follows:
which denotes the market price function without any agent omitted; it gives an upper contour to the set of market price curves.
Lemma B.1. Comparing P F (·) with any market price function
for all i and for all z ∈ (0, C].
Proof. The result is shown by examining the following two mutually exhaustive cases: Figure 14 : At k = 1: The market price curves of 5 agents with one linear demand curve
for all ǫ sufficient small. In addition, P i (z, s −i ) is non-deceasing w.r.t z, hence
Since P F (z, s) is non-deceasing w.r.t z,
as required.
The relationship between P i and P F is clearly shown in Fig. 15 . For convenience, we define 
is such that one of the following three mutually exclusive cases occurs:
1. There exists k(z) : R → Z + , 0 < k(z) ≤ i − 1 and δ(z) > 0, and there exists z δ 1 (z), z 2 (z) such that for all δ, 0 < δ < δ(z)
where p k(z)+1 = P F (z, s) and
2. There exist δ(z), z δ 1 (z), and z 2 (z) such that for all δ, 0 < δ < δ(z)
where p 1 = P F (z, s) and
3. For all z not satisfying Cases 1 and 2, if
we immediately get three mutually exclusive cases for any given z:
It is evident that k above is a function of z. Now we discuss these three cases separately.
• Case 1:
So there exists δ(z) such that
From the definition,
and
• Case 2:
Similar to Case 1, we have
and there exists δ(z) such that
• Case 3:
Remark B.3. With the non-decreasing property of P F (·, s), in Case 1 and Case 2 above,
and immediately
Remark B.4. The maximum vertical gap between the curves P F (z, s) and P i (z, s −i ) depends on z but not upon the index i ∈ {1, . . . , N }. Lemma B.5. If all agents in the quantized PSP dynamical system (2.6) share a common linear demand curve, then at most two adjacent prices result at any given iteration.
Proof. Since the demand curve is strictly decreasing, we may assume it intersects P F cv (which is defined in a similar way to P cv i ) at the point (x, y); and if, in addition, the demand curve intersects every market price curve P cv i at the point (x i , y i ) (which is unique for each market price curve), then we have x ≤ x i and y ≥ y i .
From Lemma 3.6, if there exists 0 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 such that
If p k+1 < y, we have y < p k+2 , or
We check
, we obtain y i > p k+2 or
But y ≥ y i , and x = x i when y = y i . This yields a contradiction. If P F (x, s) = p 0 = 0, we similarly can prove We claimed in Lemma 3.6 that there are at most three adjacent quantized prices resulted from the intersections between the family of demand curves and the corresponding MPFs of all agents subject to Hypothesis 3.1 and the δ-neighborhood hypothesis. We assume a demand curve θ
Proof of Lemma 3.6: The first part is true since the intersections cannot lie on two successive segments of vertP F from max 0<i,j,m,≤N
Furthermore they cannot lie on two successive segments of horP F since if this were the case, there would exist 0 < m ≤ N − 1 such that
which contradicts the δ-neighborhood hypothesis. Now we prove the second part is true in all three cases.
• When all intersections occur in Case 1, there exists 0 < m < N such that p m < y i < p m+1 for all 0 < i ≤ N . Consider Agent A i with p i < p m : we know P i (z,
For Agent A i with p i > p m , based on the knowledge P i (z,
Because of the non-decreasing property of
For Agent A i with p i = p m , it bids p m−1 after k = 0. So only two prices p m−1 , p m results after k = 0 in Case 1.
• When Case 2 occurs, there exists 0 < n ≤ N such that p n = y i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . We can see that all agents A j with p j < p n will bid p n after k = 0. But for agents A i with p i ≥ p n , we obtain
and then we have
i.e. these agents will bid p n or p n−1 at k = 1.
• In Case 3, if there exists 0 < m < N so that all intersections (x i , y i ) on horP F satisfy y i = p m and the rest intersections (x j , y j ) on vertP F satisfy p m < y j < p m+1 , then it is the case combined with Case 1 and Case 2. Based on the analysis in Case 1 and Case 2, all agents will bid p m or p m−1 after k = 0.
If there exists 0 < n ≤ N such that any (x i , y i ) on horP F satisfies y i = p n and any (x j , y j ) on vertP F satisfies p n−1 < y j < p n , then after k = 0, all agents will bid p n−1 or p n except that the agent with the initial bid (p n−1 , q n−1 ) may bid p n−2 , which will occur only when n ≥ 3. It is because, when n = 2, max 0<i,j≤N (θ
and so y i > y ii for all 1 < i ≤ N . Then for all 1 < i ≤ N ,
where α is sufficiently small. Hence all agents besides A 1 bid p 1 after k = 0, and A 1 bids 0 (if
C Completion of Proof of Theorem 3.4
In the following, we will show that Case (k = 6, I) and Case (k = 6, III) in the proof of Theorem 3.4 will not occur, and Case (k = 6, II) will repeat Case (k = 4, II).
As we know, the precondition for Cases (k = 6, I-III) to occur is that all Cases (k = 1, II), (k = 2, II), (k = 3, II), (k = 4, II), and (k = 5, II) occur together. By checking the constraint conditions such that all non-convergent cases occur before k = 6, we examine the relationships between the agent's bid prices, bid quantities, and C. After eliminating the contradictions of constrains in the previous nonconvergent cases, Case (k = 6, I) and (k = 6, III) are excluded. And even if Case (k = 6, II) occurred, all agents would bid in the same way as they did at k = 4.
We start the rather tedious analysis by checking the constraint conditions induced in the first three non-convergent cases. All nine possibilities of the relationships between r 1 , r 2 , r 3 and N such that Case (k = 3, II) occurs are given.
In each of nine possibilities, we first determine whether it results in a contradiction. If not, the existing constraint conditions for Case (k = 3, II) are compared with the newly imposed constrains once Case (k = 4, II) occurs. If there still exist possibilities such that Case (k = 4, II) occurs, we continue to compare the constraints for Case (k = 4, II) against those for Case (k = 5, II). All the multiple alternative cases are analyzed until all agents are proved to bid the same price or the oscillations between two adjacent prices are confirmed.
First, if Case (k = 1, II), Case (k = 2, II), and Case (k = 3, II) all occur, then the following conditions must be satisfied
Constraint Condition 1:
We recall that r 1 = |S 1 |, r 3 = |S 5 | respectively denote the number of agents which bid p n at k = 1 and k = 3, r 2 = |S 4 | denotes the number of agents which bid p n−1 at k = 2, and so on. From (C.33), (C.34), and Hypothesis (3.3), the relations between r 2 , r 1 and N must satisfy one of the following three conditions: N − r 2 = r 1 , N − r 2 = r 1 − 1, or N − r 2 = r 1 + 1, since from Hypothesis (3.3)
If N − r 2 = |S 3 | > r 1 + 1, from (C.36), v 21 > v 2 , but (C.33) and (C.34) contradict each other then. In the same way, we prove that N − r 2 < r 1 − 1 can not hold. Immediately, under the condition N − r 2 = r 1 − 1 and (C.36), we obtain
which implies S 2 = S 3 , r 1 = r 2 from (3.26). And under the condition N − r 2 = r 1 + 1, we obtain
which implies r 2 = r 3 i.e. S 5 = S 4 and S 3 = S 6 . The results from (C.37) and (C.38) will greatly simplify the following combinatoric discussion.
Constraint Condition 2: From (C.34) and (C.35), similar conditions are achieved: N − r 2 = r 3 + 1, N − r 2 = r 3 , or N − r 2 = r 3 − 1. If N − r 2 = r 3 + 1, r 2 = r 3 and S 5 = S 4 . If N − r 2 = r 3 − 1, r 3 = r 4 and S 5 = S 8 .
It is clear that Case (k = 3, II) would occur only when one pair of constraint conditions are satisfied, i.e. totaling 9 possibilities: (P1) N − r 2 = r 1 − 1 and N − r 2 = r 3 + 1:
We obtain r 1 = r 2 and r 2 = r 3 from the analysis above, but r 1 − 1 = r 3 + 1. So this case will not occur.
(P2) N − r 2 = r 1 + 1 and N − r 2 = r 3 + 1: r 1 = r 2 = r 3 and S 1 = S 4 = S 5 , which imply an oscillation as above.
(P3) N − r 2 = r 1 and N − r 2 = r 3 + 1: If r 1 = r 3 + 1,
that is to say r 2 = r 1 . Meantime from N − r 2 = r 3 + 1, we have r 2 = r 3 , but r 3 + 1 = r 1 . So this case will not occur.
(P4) N − r 2 = r 1 − 1 and N − r 2 = r 3 : From r 3 = r 1 − 1, we obtain r 1 = r 2 and S 1 = S 4 .
(P4.1) If r 4 = r 3 , S 6 = S 7 and C < v 41 + min i∈S8 ϕ i (p n ), which means Case (k = 4, I) and Case (k = 4, II) may occur. If C < v 41 , the system converges at k = 4. If v 41 ≤ C < v 41 + min i∈S8 ϕ i (p n ), r 4 = r 5 and S 9 = S 8 = S 5 , i.e. an oscillation starting from k = 3.
and v 41 < C < v 42 since
So Case (k = 4, II) will occur.
(P4.2.1) In Case (k = 4, II), if r 5 = r 4 , r 5 = r 3 + 1 = r 1 , which implies S 8 = S 9 and
That is to say Case (k = 5, II) occurs and r 6 = r 5 . Then S 12 = S 9 = S 8 , i.e. the system will oscillate starting from k = 4. (P4.2.2) If r 5 = r 4 − 1, r 5 = r 3 = r 1 − 1 and
So we have
On the other hand
Hence
which implies Case (k = 5, II) occurs, r 6 = r 5 + 1 = r 4 , and
that is to say Case (k = 6, II) repeats Case (k = 4, II) and the system oscillates. (P4.2.3) If r 5 ≤ r 4 −2, we obtain r 5 ≤ r 3 −1, v 52 < v 31 +min i∈S6 ϕ i (p n ) ≤ C, and Case (k = 5, III) occurs. The system will converge to p n−1 at k = 5.
(P4.3) If r 4 > r 3 + 1, N − r 4 < r 1 − 2, v 42 < v 1 ≤ C, and Case (k = 4, III) occurs. The system converges to p n−1 at k = 4.
(P5) N − r 2 = r 1 + 1 and N − r 2 = r 3 : From r 3 = r 1 + 1, we obtain S 5 = S 8 and S 6 = S 7 . Together with S 3 = S 6
and S 4 = S 5 from N − r 2 = r 1 + 1, Case (k = 4, II) occurs and falls in the same situation with Case (k = 2, II), which implies an oscillation.
(P6) N − r 2 = r 1 and N − r 2 = r 3 :
(P6.1) If r 2 = r 1 we achieve r 1 = r 2 = r 3 which means Case (k = 3, II) repeats Case (k = 1, II) and comes to an oscillation. (P6.2) If r 2 = r 1 + 1 and r 4 = r 2 = r 3 + 1, we have
which means Case (k = 4, II) repeats Case (k = 2, II) and it brings an oscillation. (P6.3) If r 2 = r 1 + 1 and r 4 = r 3 , then
i.e. only Case (k = 4, II) could occur and S 9 = S 8 = S 5 , that means Case (k = 3, II) occurs at k = 5, which leads to an oscillation. (P6.4) If r 2 = r 1 + 1 and r 4 ≥ r 3 + 2, r 1 = (N − 1)/2 = r 3 , r 2 = (N + 1)/2, r 4 ≥ (N + 3)/2, and N − r 4 ≤ (N − 3)/2. Then we have
from Hypothesis (3.3) which means the system converges to p n−1 at k = 4.
(P6.5) If r 2 ≥ r 1 + 2 and r 4 < r 2 , the system converges or oscillates before or at k = 5.
(P6.5.1) If r 2 ≥ r 1 + 2 and r 4 = r 3 , r 1 ≤ N/2 − 1 and N − r 4 ≥ N/2 + 1 i.e. v 41 > v 2 > C. So the system converges to p n at k = 4. (P6.5.2) If r 2 ≥ r 1 + 2 and r 4 = r 3 + 1, r 1 ≤ N/2 − 1 = r 3 , r 4 ≤ N/2, and N − r 4 ≥ N/2. Then we have
If Case (k = 4, I) occurs, then the system converges to p n . And if Case (k = 4, II) occurs, we have S 9 = S 8 , and from r 4 = r 3 + 1,
which means S 12 = S 9 = S 8 and Case (k = 4, II) occurs again at k = 6, i.e. an oscillation. (P6.5.3) If r 2 ≥ r 1 + 2 and r 2 > r 4 > r 3 + 1, we have r 4 ≤ r 2 − 1 and N − r 4 ≥ r 1 + 1, which means
that is to say Cases (k = 4, I) and (k = 4, II) maybe occur. If Case (k = 4, I) occurs, the system converges to p n at k = 4. If Case (k = 4, II) occurs, r 5 = r 4 and S 8 = S 9 . Since r 5 > r 3 + 1, v 51 > v 32 > C i.e. the system converges to p n at k = 5.
(P6.6) If r 2 ≥ r 1 + 2 and r 4 = r 2 . The similar proof as the case of r 2 = r 1 + 1 and r 4 = r 2 , shows Case (k = 4, II) repeats Case (k = 2, II), i.e. an oscillation in this case.
(P6.7) If r 2 ≥ r 1 + 2 and r 4 > r 2 , v 42 ≤ C and the system converges to p n−1 at k = 4.
(P7) N − r 2 = r 1 − 1 and N − r 2 = r 3 − 1: r 1 = r 2 = r 3 and S 1 = S 4 = S 5 , which imply an oscillation beginning from k = 1.
(P8) N − r 2 = r 1 + 1 and N − r 2 = r 3 − 1: N − r 2 = r 3 − 1 implies r 2 = r 3 and S 3 = S 6 . From r 3 − 1 = r 1 + 1 and Hypothesis (3.3) we achieve C < v 2 < v 31 but v 31 ≤ C if Case (k = 3, II) occurs. So this situation will not come.
(P9) N − r 2 = r 1 and N − r 2 = r 3 − 1: r 3 = r 1 + 1 and Hypothesis (3.3) imply v 31 ≤ C < v 31 + min i∈S6 ϕ i (p n ) (otherwise Case (k = 1, II) will not occur), i.e. S 5 = S 8 and r 3 = r 4 .
(P9.2) If r 2 = r 1 + 1, r 2 = r 3 = r 4 , which means Case (k = 4, II) repeats Case (k = 2, II) and comes to an oscillation. 
Outline of Proof:
The principle of the proof argument is summarized in the following steps: first we show that all prices strictly above and strictly below the (at most two) intersection prices {p * , p * * } given by {demand curve} ∩ ∪ N i=1 P cv i,1 are eliminated at k = 1 (here P cv i,1 denotes the market price curve of Agent A i at k = 0); then we recompute the market price curves of all agents at k = 1 and we show that the resulting market price functions' domains have at most three prices {p * , p * * , 0} (Lemma B.5). The set of new market price curves at k = 1 has five distinguished zones, and the intersections {demand curve} ∩ ∪ N i=1 P cv i,2 give rise to convergence in three cases: at k = 2 we show that the five possible cases repeat the situations at k = 1; the intersections between the demand curves and the market price curves at k = 2 still fall in one of five distinguished zones which, however, result from the same bid price set but different bid quantity set compared within k = 1; finally at k = 3, there is either one price left on which all agents have converged, or oscillations initiate between p * , p * * or between 0, p * * . Here p * , p * * are time-invariant and the quantized price set at k ≥ 1 includes at most 0, p * , and p * * . See (Qu, Jia & Caines 2007b , Section 4.1) for the complete proof. In fact we may show (Qu 2005 ) that under the hypotheses of Theorem D.2, oscillations between p * and p * * (or, respectively, p * * and 0) will occur if and only if N is even and C satisfies Theorem D.2 is a special case of Theorem 3.4. Theorem D.2 is particularly interesting because it only takes at most three steps to converge or begin to oscillate when agents share the same demand function, whereas it takes at most five steps in the case of Theorem 3.4. We want to highlight and direct readers' attention to this difference, therefore, we present them separately here. 
Efficiency
In those cases where the Q-PSP system converges to a quantized price p ∞ = 0, each agent obtains the return C N based on the allocation rule (2.2) and the equilibrium is efficient, i.e. N i=1 θ i (a i ) is maximized. This is clear, since by the decreasing property H2, θ i (·) is convex upwards. Hence, for all i, q 1 , q 2 , and q 3 satisfying θ ′ −1 i (0) > q 1 > q 2 > q 3 > 0 and q 1 − q 2 = q 2 − q 3 , it implies 2θ i (q 2 ) > θ i (q 1 ) + θ i (q 3 ).
On the other hand, in those cases where the Q-PSP system oscillates between p * and p * * , the social welfare value oscillates between (N − r)θ i (q * ) + rθ i ( 
